Tuesday, February 22, 2005
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, for many reasons related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), is a country of increasing importance to US foreign policy. A secular, moderate, majority-Muslim nation in the turbulent region of South Asia, Bangladesh represents hope to policymakers who aim to prove the compatibility of Islam and secular democracy. However, as a democracy that regularly experiences the effects of political Islam, with shaky institutions and a history of military coups and violence, the quality of this democracy does come into question. Finally, extreme poverty, high population density, porous borders, domestic strife, and a rising religious extremism - albeit in a minority of the population - makes Bangladesh an attractive nation of convenience for transnational group such as al-Qaida and its associated movements. Bangladesh's waterfront location at the intersection of South and Southeast Asia makes it a key transit point by land and by sea and leaves it open to country-based extremists as well, notably from Pakistan, India, and Burma (Myanmar) .
Bangladesh, for all of its weak political institutions, is a democracy that allows political access to Islamists. The worry in Bangladesh's case is that political Islam, legitimate in its own right, will provide a cover for more militant and extremist sectors of the country.
A Nation of Convenience for al-Qaida?
The Afghanistan jihad was a galvanizing force for many Bangladeshi Islamists. Bangladesh terrorism expert Bertil Litner (April 2002, The Far Eastern Economic Review, "A Cocoon of Terror") points out that "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh suggested that al-Qaida directed brigades in Afghanistan were divided among linguistic lines, of which Bengali was one, indicating that Bangladeshis and Rohingya presence must have been significant.
After the displacement of Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, members of both groups may have fled to Bangladesh for safehaven . Time Magazine in October 2002 alleged, for example, that Usama bin Ladin's right-hand man Ayman al-Zawahiri had fled to Bangladesh in March 2002, and that about 150 armed men belonging to the Taliban and al-Qaida had been transported to Bangladesh by a ship named the M/V Mecca and that 50 others had been similarly transported in 2001.
Indigenous groups with possible al-Qaida ties
There have been many incidents of violence in Bangladesh, most unattributed but thought to be connected with the Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), an offshoot of the Pakistani group. Formed in 1992, it allegedly received money and support from Usama bin Laden at its inception. According to interrogations done in 1999 by the Criminal Investigation Department of Bangladesh Police, Usama bin Ladin sanctioned about $.4 million for recruiting and training cadres and organizing terrorist and subversion activities in Bangladesh, which eventually fell into the hands of 421 madrassahs recruiting for the HUJI-B. In addition, Fazlul Rahman, a HUJI-B associate and leader of possible umbrella organization "Jihad Movement in Bangladesh" signed Usama bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa declaring holy war against the United States with American citizens becoming legitimate targets of attack.
According to the US State Department, the HUJI-B has at least six camps in Bangladesh. In May 2002, the HUJI and eight other Islamic fundamentalist groups came together to form the Bangladesh Islamic Manch (Association). By the next month, veterans of the Afghan jihad were reported to be conducting training under the auspices of the new alliance in at least two southern Bangladeshi camps.
Also belonging to the new umbrella organization were groups representing the Rohingyas and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam. The Rohingyas are a Muslim minority from Burma (Myanmar) tens of thousands of who fled their state of Arakan due to repression by the military junta. In 1991 over 250,000 fled to Bangladesh and took refuge in the towns of Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar - areas which have become havens for various religious extremists. The Rohingyas were sheltered in more than twenty camps between Cox's Bazaar and the border, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) managed to repatriate most of them. However, over 20,000 remained stranded in the camps. 100,000 to 150,000 more, though, continue to live in Bangladesh outside of UNHCR supervision. Many of these refugees may be now working with extremist groups in Bangladesh, although by many indications they are more "cannon fodder" than skilled operators. Reports indicate that many of the Rohingya recruits trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya, along with Bangladeshi extremist groups such as the HUJI-B.
Finally, an emergent group, the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh also follows a strict Salafi ideology and like the HUJI-B has targeted theaters, university professors, and cultural events. (This group was the focus of a 23 January New York Times article). The leader of the JMJB, a former fighter in the Afghan jihad known as Bangla Bhai , gained initial popularity after pacifying its citizens from a group of leftist marauders. However, similar to the situation of the Taliban, the fundamentalist activities and related attacks of the JMJB allegedly have eroded much of his support. The JMJB does, however, have the support of local politicians.
Prognosis
Bangladeshi militants have never successfully conducted a major attack, and their current sophistication is probably limited; however, increased exposure to transnational Islamic extremist groups will most likely increase their capabilities. We do not know the extent of al-Qaida and domestic terrosit cooperation. Because of increased lawlessness, a lack of government control, and proximity to international borders, the Chittagong/Cox's Bazaar/Ukhia areas of southeastern Bangladesh are still largely opaque areas of concern, with allegations of militants from Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaida affiliated Southeast Asian terrorist group, hiding out in Rohingya camps and meeting with local Muslim groups. Ukhia was in the area in which the Islamic fundamentalist groups gathered to form Bangladesh Islamic Manch, and also to where al-Qaida militants allegedly escaped in 2001.
Although there have been uncorroborated allegations of connections to Jamaat-e-Islami, the JMJB has no documented ties to either the HUJI-B or al-Qaida and has operated mostly in northeastern Bangladesh. However, this group's stated goals of the `Talibanization' of Bangladesh and of jihad against the Untied States is similar to those of both the HUJI-B and al-Qaida. If the JMJB is growing in power and organization, as some foreign press reporting has claimed, it may in the future ally with those groups and/or be co-opted by them.
Bangladesh's porous border combined with inadequate government ability to monitor militant developments make it an attractive transit state for foreign and transnational extremists. In addition, the continued refusal of the Begum Khaleda Zia government to acknowledge that extremism and terrorism are problems in Bangladesh leads to acrimonious debate between the rival Bangladeshi political parties, who blame each other for attacks and bombings, as opposed to focusing on the problems at hand.
Bangladesh is not another Afghanistan; however, it may become another Pakistan. Concerns about Bangladesh are three-fold, first and most important of which is its becoming a fortuitous location for al-Qaida training and safehaven. In addition, however, Bangladesh's proximity to Southeast Asia is a cause for concern, including a possible growing rise of pirate attacks and maritime terrorism in the Bay of Bengal, the porousness of the Burma-Bangladesh border, and a deeper influence from Jemaah Islamiyah. A final concern is the chance of Bangladesh's small group of extremists becoming gradually better organized and close-linked to al-Qaida facilitators. In the context of a new decentralized Sunni transnational network, they both can become more radicalized with broader goals as well as receive the capabilities to carry out those goals.
crossposted at RedState
Bangladesh, for all of its weak political institutions, is a democracy that allows political access to Islamists. The worry in Bangladesh's case is that political Islam, legitimate in its own right, will provide a cover for more militant and extremist sectors of the country.
A Nation of Convenience for al-Qaida?
The Afghanistan jihad was a galvanizing force for many Bangladeshi Islamists. Bangladesh terrorism expert Bertil Litner (April 2002, The Far Eastern Economic Review, "A Cocoon of Terror") points out that "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh suggested that al-Qaida directed brigades in Afghanistan were divided among linguistic lines, of which Bengali was one, indicating that Bangladeshis and Rohingya presence must have been significant.
After the displacement of Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, members of both groups may have fled to Bangladesh for safehaven . Time Magazine in October 2002 alleged, for example, that Usama bin Ladin's right-hand man Ayman al-Zawahiri had fled to Bangladesh in March 2002, and that about 150 armed men belonging to the Taliban and al-Qaida had been transported to Bangladesh by a ship named the M/V Mecca and that 50 others had been similarly transported in 2001.
Indigenous groups with possible al-Qaida ties
There have been many incidents of violence in Bangladesh, most unattributed but thought to be connected with the Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), an offshoot of the Pakistani group. Formed in 1992, it allegedly received money and support from Usama bin Laden at its inception. According to interrogations done in 1999 by the Criminal Investigation Department of Bangladesh Police, Usama bin Ladin sanctioned about $.4 million for recruiting and training cadres and organizing terrorist and subversion activities in Bangladesh, which eventually fell into the hands of 421 madrassahs recruiting for the HUJI-B. In addition, Fazlul Rahman, a HUJI-B associate and leader of possible umbrella organization "Jihad Movement in Bangladesh" signed Usama bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa declaring holy war against the United States with American citizens becoming legitimate targets of attack.
According to the US State Department, the HUJI-B has at least six camps in Bangladesh. In May 2002, the HUJI and eight other Islamic fundamentalist groups came together to form the Bangladesh Islamic Manch (Association). By the next month, veterans of the Afghan jihad were reported to be conducting training under the auspices of the new alliance in at least two southern Bangladeshi camps.
Also belonging to the new umbrella organization were groups representing the Rohingyas and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam. The Rohingyas are a Muslim minority from Burma (Myanmar) tens of thousands of who fled their state of Arakan due to repression by the military junta. In 1991 over 250,000 fled to Bangladesh and took refuge in the towns of Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar - areas which have become havens for various religious extremists. The Rohingyas were sheltered in more than twenty camps between Cox's Bazaar and the border, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) managed to repatriate most of them. However, over 20,000 remained stranded in the camps. 100,000 to 150,000 more, though, continue to live in Bangladesh outside of UNHCR supervision. Many of these refugees may be now working with extremist groups in Bangladesh, although by many indications they are more "cannon fodder" than skilled operators. Reports indicate that many of the Rohingya recruits trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya, along with Bangladeshi extremist groups such as the HUJI-B.
Finally, an emergent group, the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh also follows a strict Salafi ideology and like the HUJI-B has targeted theaters, university professors, and cultural events. (This group was the focus of a 23 January New York Times article). The leader of the JMJB, a former fighter in the Afghan jihad known as Bangla Bhai , gained initial popularity after pacifying its citizens from a group of leftist marauders. However, similar to the situation of the Taliban, the fundamentalist activities and related attacks of the JMJB allegedly have eroded much of his support. The JMJB does, however, have the support of local politicians.
Prognosis
Bangladeshi militants have never successfully conducted a major attack, and their current sophistication is probably limited; however, increased exposure to transnational Islamic extremist groups will most likely increase their capabilities. We do not know the extent of al-Qaida and domestic terrosit cooperation. Because of increased lawlessness, a lack of government control, and proximity to international borders, the Chittagong/Cox's Bazaar/Ukhia areas of southeastern Bangladesh are still largely opaque areas of concern, with allegations of militants from Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaida affiliated Southeast Asian terrorist group, hiding out in Rohingya camps and meeting with local Muslim groups. Ukhia was in the area in which the Islamic fundamentalist groups gathered to form Bangladesh Islamic Manch, and also to where al-Qaida militants allegedly escaped in 2001.
Although there have been uncorroborated allegations of connections to Jamaat-e-Islami, the JMJB has no documented ties to either the HUJI-B or al-Qaida and has operated mostly in northeastern Bangladesh. However, this group's stated goals of the `Talibanization' of Bangladesh and of jihad against the Untied States is similar to those of both the HUJI-B and al-Qaida. If the JMJB is growing in power and organization, as some foreign press reporting has claimed, it may in the future ally with those groups and/or be co-opted by them.
Bangladesh's porous border combined with inadequate government ability to monitor militant developments make it an attractive transit state for foreign and transnational extremists. In addition, the continued refusal of the Begum Khaleda Zia government to acknowledge that extremism and terrorism are problems in Bangladesh leads to acrimonious debate between the rival Bangladeshi political parties, who blame each other for attacks and bombings, as opposed to focusing on the problems at hand.
Bangladesh is not another Afghanistan; however, it may become another Pakistan. Concerns about Bangladesh are three-fold, first and most important of which is its becoming a fortuitous location for al-Qaida training and safehaven. In addition, however, Bangladesh's proximity to Southeast Asia is a cause for concern, including a possible growing rise of pirate attacks and maritime terrorism in the Bay of Bengal, the porousness of the Burma-Bangladesh border, and a deeper influence from Jemaah Islamiyah. A final concern is the chance of Bangladesh's small group of extremists becoming gradually better organized and close-linked to al-Qaida facilitators. In the context of a new decentralized Sunni transnational network, they both can become more radicalized with broader goals as well as receive the capabilities to carry out those goals.
crossposted at RedState
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